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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The federal government is actively involved in encouraging theformation
and growth of private pensions and in regulating their behavior.The
primary form of encouragement is the government's tax subsidirationof
pensions. A primary attribute of pension plan provisions isan implicit tax
on employment after certain ages. The primary form of pension regulation
is through ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income SecurityAct. The
government's involvement in encouraging and regulating privatepensions
appears to reflect its desire that workers have a securesource of old-age
income that will lessen their relianceon Social Security. In recent years the
government has reacted to demographic changes, their effectson Social
Security funding, and the increase in early retirement byalso using its
pension and Social Security tax and regulatory policies toencourage
workers to delay their retirement decision.
This chapter examines the structure of pension plans withtwo questions
in mind. First, have government pension backloading regulationsaimed at
ensuring future pension benefits been effective? Second, has thestructure
of old-age pension accrual at the end of the workspan,an implicit tax,
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greatly limited the effectiveness of government policy inreversing the
trend to early retirement? The answers to these questions areimportant for
assessing the benefits of the government's tax subsidizationof pensions as
they are currently structured.
Our principal findings are as follows:
ERISA regulations notwithstanding, a significant proportionof defined
benefit plans exhibit severe backloading. Indeed,backloading is an
inherent property of defined benefit pension plans.
A large fraction of defined benefit plans embed verysubstantial old-age
work disincentives through an implicit tax on wage earnings.
These pension retirement incentives are often much greaterthan Social
Security's retirement incentives.
Evidence from one large Fortune 500 firm indicatesthat pension
retirement incentives can greatly increase the extent ofearly retirement.
1. INTRODUCTION
The federal government is actively involved in encouragingthe formation
and growth of private pensions and in regulating theirbehavior. The
primary form of encouragement is the government's taxsubsidization of
pensions. Workers are taxed on their pension benefits notwhen they
accrue but when they are received, atwhich time their tax brackets may be
much lower. In addition, pension saving accumulatestax-free interest. The
primary form of pension regulation is through ERISA,the 1974 Employee
Retirement Income Security Act. The government'sinvolvement in encour-
aging and regulating private pensions appears toreflect its desire that
workers have a secure source of old-age incomethat wifi lessen their
reliance on Social Security. In recent years the governmenthas reacted to
demographic changes, projected Social Security financialproblems, and
the increase in early retirement by adjusting somewhatits policies to
encourage workers to delay theirretirement decision. But, as yet, the
government does not appear to have recognizedthe extent to which the
provisions of private pension plans encourage early retirement.
This chapter examines the structure of pension planswith two questions
in mind. First, have government pension backloadingregulations aimed at
securing workers their future pension benefits beeneffective? Second, has
the structure of old-age pension accrual at the end of theworkspan greatly
limited the effectiveness of government policy inreversing the trend to
early retirement? The answers to these questions are importantfor assess-
ing the effects of the government's tax subsidizationof pensions, as they
are currently structured.Pension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives163
1.1 Government Concern with PensionBackloading and the Labor
Supply of the Aged
Over the past two decades thegovernment has been concerned with the
backloading (delaying) of the accrual of vestedpension benefits. Limiting
the backloading of pension benefit accrual isan important objective of
ERISA as well as subsequent legislation. Thegovernment's main concern
with pension backloading, reflected in ERISA'svesting and minimum
benefit accrual requirements,appears to be to ensure that older workers are
not terminated, either intentionallyor unintentionally, just in advance of
accruing significant pension benefits. SenatorBentsen expressed this
concern in introducing ERISA to Congress: "Thereare instances where
workers have not received pension benefits that theyhave earned through
years of long hard labor. Their dreams of financial security afterretirement
have been shattered." Although the legislationappears intended to limit
the extent of backloading in defined benefitpension plans, it seems not to
recognize that backloading is inherent in the benefitformulae of most
defined benefit plans; it cannot be legislatedaway.
Another reason for concern about excessive pensionbackloading and,
more generally, the pattern of pension benefit accrual involvesretirement
incentives. If most pension benefitsaccrue before a particular age, say the
age of early retirement, beyond which additional accrual isnegligible or
possibly negative, workers will havean incentive to remain with the firm
up to early retirement and then leave the firm. In effect, pensionprovisions
often impose a tax on earnings aftera particular age; wage earnings are
offset by loss in pension wealth. This implicittax could thus be a major
explanation of the trend toward early retirement,a trend that the govern-
ment is seeking to reverse through planned increases in theage at which
Social Security benefits are received.
Although the backers of the ERISA legislationwere apparently
prompted by the potential avoidance of pension liabifitiesthrough layoff,
backloading of pension accrual has muchmore general implications for
worker mobifity. Job change, by itself, reducespension benefits. Even if it
involves no change in futurewage earnings and even if the provisions of
the pension plans on the old andnew jobs are the same, workers who
change jobs will typically have much lowerpension benefits at retirement
age than those who remain with the same employer. Thus,pension
provisions may inhibit worker mobility and, therefore,adjustment to
changing economic circumstances.
The 1980s have withesseda marked shift in government policy toward
promoting the labor supply of the elderly. Thegovernment has virtually
eliminated mandatory retirement and scheduleda gradual increase in164Kotlikoff & Wise
Social Security's retirement age. It has limited somewhatSocial Security's
earnings test that reduces Social Security benefitsfor "retired" workers
earning more than an "exempt amount"; it haseliminated the earnings test
after age 70 and is increasing the actuarial incentive todelay the receipt of
Social Security benefits beyond age 65. The governmenthas also required
that pension plans provide continued pensionbenefit accrual for workers
who remain with the firm beyond the pensionplan's normal retirement
age.
1.2 Demographic Change Meets theTrend Toward Early
Retirement
The change in government policy toward thelabor supply of the elderly is
responsive to the major demographic swingcurrently underway, with its
important implications for retirement finances inthe next century. The
elderly (those over 64), who now constitute aboutone-fifth of all adults,
wifi constitute about two-fifths of all adults by2040. Given Social Security's
pay-as-you-go method of finance, theprojected increase in the ratio of
beneficiaries to contiibutors means either significant cutsin future benefits
or significant future increasesin Social Security's payroll tax rate. Although
the 1983 Social Security legislation provides aplan for dealing with the baby
boomer's demographic bulge, there is real concern thatthe plan will not be
fully implemented; and if it is fully implemented,there is concern that it
wifi not be sufficient.
Reversing the trend toward early retirement represents animportant
alternative for addressing the demographictransition. Additional labor
supply of the elderly would relieve Social Security'sfinances as well as
offset a potential shortage in the supply of labor relative tothat of other
productive factors. Despite recent changes in governmentpolicy, the early
retirement trend remains quite strong. Table1 presents the labor force
participation rates of men between ages 40 to 64 since1967. In 1967 the
labor force participation rate of men aged 55 to 59 was90.1 percent; it was
81.9 percent in 1980 and 79.0 percent in 1986.For males 60 to 64 the 1986
labor force participation rate was 54.9 percent,down from 61.0 percent in
1980 and 77.6 percent in 1967. The participation rateof men over 65 fell
from 35 percent in 1960 to below 20 percent in 1980(figures not shown in
the table).
1.3 Are Pension Plans the Major Old-Age WorkDeterrent?
Economists have pointed to Social Security as well asgeneral increases in
living standards as the key explanations forincreased early retirement, but
little attention has been given to the retirementincentives associated withPension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives165
TABLE 1
Labor Force Participation Rates of Men
Source: Employment and earnings, various years.
private pension plan provisions. Our analysis of a recent Bureau of Labor
Statistics cross-section survey of pension plans indicates a large proportion
with substantially backloaded pension plans; these plans typically have
very sizable accrual as the age of either early or normal retirement
approaches, and they often have more lower, or even negative, pension
accrual, thereafter. Such accrual profiles engender very large implicit taxes
on labor supply beyond the age at which the significant pension accrual
occurs. These old-age pension work disincentives often exceed those
arising from the effect of Social Security provisions on Social Security
accrual and from the effect of the Social Security earnings test. In addition
to fostering early retirement, such accrual profiles raise the concern, voiced
by Senator Bensten, that workers may be terminated, or change jobs for
other reasons, immediately prior to accruing the great majority of their
pension benefits.
Age
Year 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
1967 97.0 96.2 94.2 90.1 77.6
1968 97.0 95.9 93.9 90.0 77.3
1969 96.7 95.7 93.5 89.6 75.8
1970 96.5 95.4 93.1 89.5 75.0
1971 96.3 94.9 92.8 88.8 74.1
1972 96.2 94.6 91.9 87.4 72.5
1973 95.8 94.3 91.7 86.2 69.1
1974 95.5 94.0 90.4 85.7 67.9
1975 95.2 94.1 90.1 84.4 65.7
1976 95.0 93.3 89.9 83c6 63.7
1977 95.3 93.2 89.2 83.2 62.9
1978 95.1 93.0 89.7 82.9 62.0
1979 95.3 93.4 89.6 82.2 61.8
1980 95.1 93.3 89.3 81.9 61.0
1981 94.9 93.4 89.6 81.3 58.7
1982 94.7 92.8 89.7 81.9 57.2
1983 94.8 93.3 89.1 80.7 57.0
1984 95.1 93.3 88.9 80.2 56.1
1985 94.7 93.3 88.6 79.6 55.6
1986 94.3 92.9 88.9 79.0 54.9166Kotlikoff & Wise
1.4 Organization of the Paper
Before presenting the new evidence on pension backloading practices, we
briefly discuss in the next section a possible economic rationale for pension
backloading as well as the potential economic problems arising fromthe
government's regulation of the pattern of pension accrual and, more
generally, its anti-age-discrimination policy.
Section 3 introduces the concept of pension accrual and demonstrates
how in many instances it imposes an implicit tax on wage earnings;
sometimes it increases total compensation, and sometimes it reduces it.
Illustrative graphs indicate that defined benefit pension plans aretypically
severely backloaded. Section 4 discusses ERISA's antibackloading rulesand
suggests why they are ineffective in limiting backloading. Section 5 pres-
ents findings on the accrual of pension benefits based on the 1979Bureau
of Labor Statistics Level of Benefits Survey (BLS-LOB). This surveyof 1,469
establishments with 3,386,121 pension participants provides extremely
detailed information concerning vesting, early and normal retirement
benefits, supplemental early retirement benefits, and Social Security offset
formulae, each of which is a crucial input to the calculation of pension
accruals.
Section 6 examines the retirement response of workers in a large Fortune
500 company to the pattern of pension accrual. The pension accrualprofile
for this firm exhibits very substantial backloading with disproportionate
benefit accrual at the age of early retirement and only modestaccrual
thereafter. This pension accrual profile appears to substantially increase the
early retirement of the firm's employees. We estimate that the firm's
accrual profile increases from 14 to 44 percent the probabffity that a worker
at age 55 will leave employment prior to age 60. Thelast section briefly
summarizes our findings and raises some questions relevant to pension
policy.
2. AN ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR PENSION
BACKLOADING
In recent years the traditional spot-market view of thelabor market, in
which compensation equals productivity at each point in time, has given
way to a contract view. According tothe contract view, workers and firms
enter into long-term relationships, which may be explicit orimplicit, in
which there is a relationship over time between compensation andproduc-
tivity but not necessarily an equality between the two at anygiven point in
time.Pension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives167
The economic rationale for long-term labor contracts as opposed to short-
term spot-market arrangements is that firms can structure compensation
over the workspan to improve worker incentives. For example, by paying
workers for less than they produce when young and for more than they
produce when old, the firm provides the worker with an enhanced
incentive to remain with the firm. It may also provide an incentive to work
harder; the cost of shirking becomes not only the loss of one's current salary
but also the lost opportunity to earn more than one produces in the future.
This carrot-stick age-related structure of compensation is potentially bene-
ficial not only to employers but to workers as well. By reducing worker
turnover and increasing effort, the firm can afford to pay workers a higher
present value of compensation. Such higher present-value payments to
workers reflect not the benevolence of employers but the outcome of a
competitive contract market in which firms compete with each other in
hiring workers.
Although the long-term contract view of labor arrangements implies that
the firm will compensate the worker in excess of his or her productivity
after an initial period in which the reverse is true, the length of time during
which compensation exceeds productivity cannot be unlimited. The firm's
competitive interest is in reimbursing the worker when old for earning less
than he or she produced when young, not paying the worker more than is
necessary to balance the account. Hence, the firm's interest is in fixing the
length of time in which compensation exceeds productivity. As pointed out
by Lazear (1981,1982), mandatory retirement provides a convenient mech-
anism for limiting this time period.
Compensation can be paid as wage earnings or as pension accrual.
Therefore, one mechanism for paying deferred compensation at certain
ages and for reducing compensation at subsequent ages is to provide
significant positive pension accrual prior to a critical age and small or even
negative pension accrual thereafter.
In eliminating mandatory retirement the government may have reduced
one important mechanism by which employers were able to limit the
amount of deferred compensation. If Congress were also to proscribe
abrupt changes in the age-profile of pension or any other form of compen-
sation, firms might find it even more difficult to structure deferred
compensation effidently.
In addition to potential assistance in providing work incentives, the age
profile of pension accrual may represent a graceful mechanism to lower the
wages of older workers if, as seems likely (Kotlikoff (1987)), they become
less productive with age. As described below, pension accrual after early
and/or normal retirement ages is often quite small, if not negative.168Kotlikoff & Wise
3. PENSION BENEFIT ACCRUAL FORMULAE AND
IMPLICIT TAX ON WAGE EARNINGS
Vested pension benefit accrual at age a, 1(a), equals the difference between
pension wealth at age a+1, Pw(a+1), and pension wealth at age a, Pw(a),
accumulated to age a+ 1 at the nominal interest rate r: that is,
1(a) = Pw(a + 1) - Pw(a)(1 + r). (1)
Pension accrual is thus the increment to pension wealth in excess of the
return on the previously accumulated pension bank account. Pension
wealth at age a is defined as the expected value of vested pension benefits
discounted to age a. The term "expected" refers to the use of mortality
probabilities to assess the chances that the worker will be alive at future
ages when benefits are available. Intuitively, Pw(a) can be thought of asthe
worker's pension bank account. If 1(a) = 0, the worker continuing employ-
ment with the plan sponsor at age a has exactly the same pension wealth
at age a + 1 as an identically situated worker who terminates employment
at age a. The worker receives no compensation in the form of increased
future pension benefits.
Figure 1 presents the age profile of accrued pension benefits divided by
wages for a hypothetical plan under different assumptions about real wage
growth and nominal interest rates. The top profile, for example, is based on
a 3 percent rate of real wage growth and a 9 percent nominal interest rate.
The inflation rate assumed in each profile is 6 percent. The plan provides
100 percent vesting at ten years of service and calculates normal retirement
benefits as 1 percent of average earnings over the last five years of service
times the number of years of service. The plan's early and normal
retirement ages are 55 and 65, respectively. Workers can retire early and
receive early retirement benefits that equal normal retirement benefits
reduced by 3 percent for each year that retirement precedes the normal
retirement age.
There are two significant discontinuities in the profiles. One occurs at
age 40 when the worker becomes vested; clearly in going from age 39 to age
40 the worker's vested pension wealth changes abruptly from zero to a
positive number explaining the jump in the profile. The second disconti-
nuity occurs at the age of early retirement. It arises because the 3 percent
per year early retirement reduction factor is much more generous than an
actuarial reduction. By retiring a year earlier, the worker gains a year's
benefit with only a modest, 3 percent, payment for that delay. To
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FIGURE 1. Pension increments as a percentage of salary, byage, for a
wage stream with 6 percent inflation discounted at real interest rates of 3
percent, 6 percent, and 9 percent.
accrual at early retirement, consider thecase in which the early retirement
reduction factor is zero. In this case by workingan additional year after age
55, the worker loses that year's benefit entirely. Although itis true that the
worker's future benefit wifi likely be larger because ofan additional year of
service and possibly an increase iii the earnings base, the loss ofthis year's
benefit may significantly offset oreven outweigh, in present value, this
benefit increase, implying a small or negative pension accrualduring the
period after early retirement.
The diagram indicates roughly a halving in the accrualratio between
ages 55 and 56. Beyond age 55 the accrual ratio declines gradually. Ifone
assumes a sufficiently high interest rate, the accrual after age 55 is negative.
According to the three curves, total compensation is roughly8 percent
lower, ceteris paribus, at age 65 than atage 55. The diagram also indicates
that much of the accrual of vested pension benefitsoccurs in the ages
immediately preceding age 55. Figure 2 shows the effect of the lower-than-
actuarial reduction for early retirement on the hypothetical plan'saccrual
profile. It compares the top profile of Figure 1 with the profilethat would
occur if the reduction factor were actuarial or, what is equivalent, if workers
were forced to wait until the normal retirement age to collect benefits.
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FIGURE 2. Pension increments as a percentage of salary, by age,for
plans with an early retirement option versus retirement at65. 6 percent
wage inflation, 3 percent real interest rate.
backloading in the "Retirement at 65 Only" profile is even greaterthan that
in the profile with the early retirement option.This is inherent in the
defined benefit formula, with the benefit at age a typicallygiven by B(a) =
kW(a)T(a), where W(a) is the wage at age a, T(ci) is yearsof service at age a,
and k is a multiplier often between 0.01 and 0.02. If k =0.02, the worker's
benefit, in nominal dollars, is 2 percent of his final wagefor each year of
service; after working thirty years, the pension wouldequal 60 percent of
the final wage.
3.1 The Accrual Profile for a Large Fortune 500 Firm
The profiles presented in the first two diagrams,although indicative of a
considerable degree of backloading, are based on ahypothetical plan with
rather simple features. But if one thing is true of privatepension plans, it
is that there is enormous variation among them.Figure 3 presents the
pension accrual profile of male managers hired at age 20 inthe Fortune 500
firm whose retirement behavior is discussed in Section 6.The diagram also
includes the estimated age-wage profile in absolute 1985dollars for the
managers as well as the age-accrualprofile of Social Security benefits.
In addition to having ten-year "cliff" vesting, a two-stepearnings-related
normal retirement benefit formula, this plan has a SocialSecurity offset, a

















FIGURE 3. Pension wealth accrual, SS accrual, and wage earnings for
male managers born in 1960 and hired in 1980, in real 1985 dollars.
reduction factors. The supplemental early retirement benefit and the
less-than-actuarially fair reduction factors are available only to workers who
remain with the firm through age 55, the early retirement age. Workers
who leave at age 54 or earlier can start collecting their vested benefits atage
55, but these benefits are actuarially reduced. In addition, such pre-early
retirement terminators receive benefits that are immediately reduced by the
Social Security offset. In contrast, for workers retiring at age 55or later, the
Social Security offset does not occur until age 65; hence, the supplemental
early retirement benefit corresponds to the Social Security offset for each
year between the age of retirement and age 65.
Thus there are two important reasons for the accrual spike at early
retirement in Figure 3. The first is the nonactuarial early retirement
reduction factors and the fact that they are available only to those remain-
ing with the firm until age 55; the second is the delay in the Social Security
offset, which is also only provided to workers remaining through early
retirement.
Now that we understand the source of the large accrual spike in Figure
3, let us consider its size and implications. First the spike atage 55 is very
largeover one-and-one-half times a year's earnings. Second, betweenage




















quite important. However, after age 60 accrual is negative,becoming
significantly negative by age 65. Clearly, this is an extremely backloaded
pension plan that provides workers with a strong incentive toremain with
the firm through early retirement and a strong incentive toleave the firm
thereafter. For workers who quit or otherwise lose theirjobs at, for
example, age 54, there is a very substantial loss in benefitscompared with
remaining on the job through age 55. In its effect accrualprofiles of this
kind recreate the situation of some plans prior to ERISA inwhich workers
could be terminated immediately before they accrued thebulk of their
potential pension benefits. There is clear evidence that thisdoes not
happen in this firm, however.
4. HOW FIRMS MAY CIRCUMVENT ERISA'S
ANTIBACKLOADING RULES
ERISA stipulates that defined benefit pension accrual mustsatisfy one of
three provisions. The first is a 3 percent rule that says thatworkers' accrued
benefits must exceed their years of service times 3 percentof the normal
retirement benefit they would have if they had begun service atthe earliest
possible age of participation and had remained with the firm untilnormal
retirement. That is, for each year of employment pension,accrual must be
at least 3 percent of the amount the workers wifi haveif they stay until
normal retirement. The second provision is a 133 percent rule that saysthat
future projected annual pension accrual cannot exceed 133 percentof
current annual pension accrual. The third provisionstipulates that the
terminating worker's benefit be not less than his or herprojected normal
retirement benefit times the ratio of actual completed service tothe service
the worker would have if he or she remained with the firmthrough early
retirement. That is, if the worker leaves after twenty yearsand normal
retirement would be after forty years, the benefit mustbe 50 percent of
what the worker would have if he or she worked twenty more years.
Each of these three provisions specifies that the projectionof future
normal retirement benefits and future pension accrual be determinedby
assuming that a worker's future wage equals the current wage.But if there
is wage inflation, future wages may be much greater than current wages,
and the real value of current accrual may be quite low. Thus even amodest
rate of wage inflation could permit a quite backloaded planthat, nonethe-
less, meets one of the three antibackloading provisions.The choice of other
assumptions in the accrual calculation, such as the interest rate, alsogive
firms additional latitude in deferring pension accrual.
However, the main method of backloading that does not appear tobePension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives173
ruled out by the three ERISA rules involves early retirementprovisions.
The accrual rules pertain to normal retirement benefitsrather than early
retirement benefits. Extra benefits arising from supplemental earlyretire-
ment benefits or from less-than-actuarial reductions of early retirement
benefits do not appear to be considered in the three antibackloadingrules.
Thus a firm could structure its plan to have small normal retirementbenefit
but to have substantial early retirement benefit, for example. It couldeasily
conform its accrual of the small normal retirement benefitto one of the
three ERISA rules, yet remain free to specify quite large earlyretirement
benefits that only accrue if the worker stays with the firm througha critical
age. Recall the example of the large firm considered here; this firm provides
extra early retirement benefits in the form of (1)a waiver until the age of
normal retirement in their offset of benefits due to Social Securityand (2)
less-than-actuarial early retirement reduction rates.
5. PENSION ACCRUAL IN THE BLS-LOB DATA
In this section we examine accrual ratios for earnings-based definedbenefit
plans from the BLS-LOB survey. Earnings-based plansaccount for approx-
imately 80 percent of BLS-designated usable plans from thesurvey and
about 65 percent of plans weighted by pensioncoverage. Each of the
earnings-based plans we examine stipulates cliff vesting atten years, but
the plans have different normal and early retirementages. Other earnings-
based plans with different vestingages have accrual profiles similar to
those that we shall describe, but for convenience ofexposition we have not
included them in our analysis here. Of the 1,183 earnings-basedplans we
examine, 508 are integrated with Social Security underan offset formula.
The accrual profiles were calculated under the assumption ofa 6 percent
nominal wage growth up to age 65, after which nominalwage growth is
assumed to be zero. We also assume a 9 percent interestrate. Our
calculations are based on the industry-occupation-age-earningsprofiles
reported in Kotlikoff and Wise (1987).
5.1 The Decline in Pension Wealth Accrual at Early andNormal
Retirement Ages
Age profiles of the average ratio of pension accrualto the wage for the
percent of earnings plans with ten-year cliff vestingare shown in Table 2 by
early and normal retirement ages. Three of theseaverage profiles, corre-
sponcling to plans with the respective early and normal retirementages-
55-55, 55-65, 65-65are graphed in Figure 4. The 55-55 and the65-65
profiles show a considerable degree of backloading, the firstwith dispro-174Kotlikoff & Wise
TABLE 2
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent ofEarnings Plans With
Ten-YearCliffVesting, by Early and Normal Retirement Age'
Early ret. 55 55 55 60 60 62 62 65
Normal ret. 55 60 65 60 65 62 65 65
No. of plans152 115 513 78 53 19 8 50
Age
40 .244 .111 .071 .034 .047 .038 .054 .036
41 .045 .022 .013 .007 .010 .016 .009 .010
42 .051 .026 .016 .008 .011 .017.010 .011
43 .058 .029 .018 .010.013 .120 .011 .012
44 .066 .033 .020 .011 .015 .029.013 .014
45 .075 .036 .023 .013.017 .036 .013 .016
46 .085 .043 .026 .016 .019.042 .015 .018
47 .097 .050 .031 .028 .022 .047 .017 .021
48 .110 .057 .035 .039 .025 .054 .019 .024
49 .124 .064 .040 .056 .029 .060 .021 .027
50 .141 .077 .046 .065 .034 .068.023 .031
51 .159.072 .052 .084 .040 .077 .026.033
52 .180.087 .062 .091 .050 .090 .028 .043
53 .204 .099 .072 .105.060 .101 .032 .050
54 .231 .113 .083 .117.068 .114 .035 .055
55 .261 .130 .097 .149.082 .128 .039 .065
56 - .003 .100 .068 .170 .094.144 .036 .068
57 - .012 .111 .072 .192 .107 .162 .039 .076
58 - .020 .118 .076 .224 .127 .184 .044 .089
59 - .028 .129.077 .241 .146 .208 .048.105
60 - .038 .143 .079 .269 .167 .241 .054.118
61 -.048 -090 .068- .061 .113.220 .059 .128
62 - .058- .091 .064- .091 .115.248 .066 .145
63 - .067- .091 .056- .114 .114- .130.017 .163
64 - .076- .092 .053- .121 .114- .136 .012 .186
65 - .085- .094 .044- .121 .112- .144 .006 .211
66 - .292- .169- .152- .138- .088- .266- .081- .194
67 - .294- .174- .162- .155- .115- .263- .080- .204
68 - .295- .179- .171- .171- .142- .260- .079- .213
69 - .296- .182- .179- .184- .162- .258- .078- .221
70 - .297- .184- .186- .196- .182- .255- .077- .234
Plans with early or normal retirement supplements areexcluded.Pension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives175
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FIGURE 4. Weighted average accrual rates for percentage of earnings
plans with ten-yearcliffvestinfor selected early and normal retirement
ages.
portionate accrual as age approaches 55, and the second as age approaches
65. In addition, each graph shows substantial dedines in the rate of
pension wealth accrual at several critical ages. The first is the age of normal
retirement, which equals the age of early retirement for plans with no early
retirement option. Second, there is a sharp decline in the rate of accrual at
the age of early retirement, but this decline is substantially lower than the
decline at the normal retirement age. Third, there is a very substantial
decline between ages 65 and 66 in the average accrual rate no matter what
the ages of early and normal retirement. This age 65 decline would,
however, be smaller under current law, which mandates continued partic-
ipation in the plan's benefit formula after the plan's normal retirement age.
This 1986 legislation was not incorporated in these accrual analyses because
the law postdates our information on the pension plans. The new law may
have temporarily altered the postnormal retirement accrual pattern. But, if
the patterns depicted here were chosen for a specific reason, and there is
little evidence that they were or that they were not, plans could add
additional features that wifi restore the pre-1986 decline in pension accrual
after normal retirement.
The declines in average accrual rates at the critical ages indicated in Table176Kotlikoff & Wise
TABLE 3
Early and normal retirement age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
55 55 55 60 60 62 62 65
Age 55 60 65 60 65 62 65 65
2 are highlighted in Table 3. The ages of early and normal retirement are
identical in columns 1, 4, 6, and 8 of the table with respective retirement
ages of 55, 60, 62, and 65. At these ages theaccrual rate as a percentage of
wages declines from 0.26 toO, 0.27 to 0.06, 0.25 to-0.13, and 0.21 to -0.19,
respectively. Thus, total annual compensation (wage plus pension accrual)
from working declines at these ages by 21 percent, 26 percent, 30 percent,
and 33 percent, respectively. Surely the incentive beyond these ages to
continue work with the current employer is substantially reduced.
In instances where early and normal retirement ages do not coincide,
there is also a substantial decline in the average ratio of pension accrual to
the wage at the age of normal retirement. For example, among planswith
early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 60, the averagedecline is
from 0.14 to -0.09. There is also a decline at the age of early retirement for
these plans, although it is considerably less than the decline at the ageof
normal retirement. For example, of plans with early retirement at 55 and
normal retirement at 65, the average decline at 55 is from 0.10 to 0.07,
whereas at 65 the average decline is from 0.04 to -0.15.
The figure and the table also show a large variation in average pension
accrual at 40, the age of cliff vesting. It is highest, on average, for plans with
early and normal retirement at 55 and lowest, on average, for plans with
early and normal retirement at 65. As mentioned, because theearly
retirement reduction is typically less than actuarially fair, pension wealth-
the present value of the future stream of benefit payments-isgenerally
greatest if benefits are taken at the age of early retirement. Thus theaccrued
40 .244 .111 .071 .034 .047 .038 .054 .036
55 .261 .130 .097
56 - .003 .100 .068
60 .143 .269 .167
61 - .090 - .061 .113
62 .248 .066
63 - .130 .017
65 - .085- .094 .044- .121 .112- .144 .006 .211
66 - .292- .169- .152- .138- .088- .266- .081- .194
70 - .297- .184- .186- .196- .182- .255- .077- .234
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Plans with early or normal retirement supplementsare excluded
FIGURE 5. Weighted average accrualrates and upper and lower 5
percentile levels for percentage of earnings planswith ten-year cliff
vesting. Early retirement at 55, and normalretirement at 65.
wealth at the age of vesting is usually calculatedby discounting benefits
from the age of early retirement, assumingthat the worker could begin to
collect benefits at that age. Figure 4, forexample, shows an average vesting
spike of almost 25 percent of earnings for55-55 plans, 7 percent of earnings
for 55-65 plans, and about 4 percent ofearnings for 65-65 plans.
5.2 Variation Among Plans
Even among plans with the same early andnormal retirement ages there is
wide variation in accrual rates at eachage, particularly after the age of early
retirement. Consider the accrual ratio atage 55. The average ratio for this
subsample is 0.097, the maximum is 0.405, and theminimum is 0. The ratio
at the lowest fifth percentile is 0, at the highest fifthpercentile it is 0.208.
There is a similarly large dispersion in annualaccrual ratios at each of the
ages 40 through 70. Weighted average accrual rates togetherwith upper
and lower 5 percentile levels are graphed in Figure5. The average accrual
rates between ages 55 and 65 are positive; formany plans, however, the
rates prior to age 65 are very negative. Thus it isvery important not to base
judgments about the labor force participation incentiveeffects of pensions simplyon
the basis of average accrual rates.
Upper 5 percentile
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Additional evidence of the variabffity ofpension accrual profiles and the
possibffity of severely backloaded plans isobtained by comparing profiles
of particular plans. Figure 6 plotsthe accrual profiles of four of the sample's
largest plans. Plan 1 exhibits a 29percent vesting spike, a reduction of 30
percentage points in the accrualratio at age 55 and a further major
reduction at age 65 from 0.063 to -0.351. In contrast, the vesting spike is
only 4 percent for plan 2 in thefigure. This plan also exhibits no major
reduction in the accrual ratioafter early retirement and only a minor
reduction at normal retirement.Plan 3's vesting spike is much lessthan
that of plan 1, but the drop inaccrual at age 55 is very much larger thanthat
in plan 1. This plan also exhibitsextremely sharp changes in accrual ratios
at ages 60 and 63. Plan 4exhibits even greater discontinuities inthe accrual
profile and more backloading than Plan3. It shows little accrual before age
55, accrual at 55 equivalent to about75 percent of the wage, littleaccrual at
ages 56 through 59,accrual at 60 almost twice as large as wageearnings,
then negative accrual at ages 61through 63 equivalent to about 50 percentof
the wage. Clearly, the plans'incentive effects on labor force participation
also vary widely.
5.3 Accrual Ratios by Industryand Occupation
Holding fixed the early and normalretirement ages, we see little difference
in average accrual profiles acrossindustries or occupations. But sincethesePension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives179
retirement ages differ, on average, particularlyacross industries, a typical
worker faces a much greater incentive insome industries to leave the labor
force early. For example, a large proportion of workerscovered by pensions
in transportation would experience a 27 percent reductionin effective
compensation by continuing to work between 55 and 56. At55, pension
accrual would be equivalent to about 27 percent ofwage rates for many
workers in this industry, but if the worker continued in the laborforce until
age 66 the annual loss in pension wealth would be equivalent to 30percent
of wage earnings at 66. A large proportion of workers inmanufacturing
have plans with early retirement at 55 and normalretirement at 65. In this
case, the accrual at 55 averages about 9 percent of the wage at 55 and only
declines to about 7 percent of the wage by 65. But then theaccrual rate
becomes negative, and if the workerwere to continued in the labor force
between 65 and 66 the decline in pension accrual wouldamount to an
effective reduction in compensation of about 21percent.
5.4 The Possible Impact of the 1986 Age DiscriminationAct on
Pension Accrual
Table 4 isolates the potential impact of the 1986 legislationrequiring
continued participation in the pension formula after the plan'snormal
retirement age. The table presents the accrual ratios forpercentage of
earnings plans with early retirement at 55 and selected normalretirement
ages calculated by first assuming that all of the plans had a provisionto
credit fully postnormal retirement service and second byassuming that all
the plans had no such credit provision. The table indicates that theeffect of
crediting service after normal retirement depends importantlyon the age of
normal retirement. For plans with a normal retirementage of 55, negative
accrual ratios are larger in absolute value underno crediting prior to age 66
and smaller in absolute value thereafter. A similarpattern, although less
pronounced, is observed after age 62 for plans with normalretirement at
that age. The least effect is found for the mostcommon plans, those with
normal retirement at 65 (and early retirement at 55). If pension plansdo not
alter some other features to reproduce the pre-1986 retirementincentives,
the 1986 legislation wifi have a nontrivial affecton retirement incentives for
some plans at some ages. But even if plans are not restructured, fully
crediting postnormal retirement service has onlya minor impact on accrual
after age 66 for most pension plans.
5.5 Early and Normal Retirement Supplements and the Potential
for Backloading
Approximately 11.4 percent of plans have early retirement supplements,
and 7.5 percent have normal ones. The typical normal retirementsupple-180Kotlikoff & Wise
TABLE 4
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percentof Earnings Plans With
Ten-Year Cliff Vesting and EarlyRetirement at 55, by Normal
Retirement Age, Assuming FullCredit and No Credit Postretirement
Provisions
Normal ret. 55 55 62 62 65 65
NC FC NC FC NC
No. of plans 152 152 187 187 513 513
Age
40 .244 .244 .106 .106 .071 .071
41 .045 .045 .023 .023 .013 .013
42 .051 .051 .027 .027 .016 .016
43 .058 .058 .032 .031 .018 .018
44 .066 .066 .035 .035 .020 .020
45 .075 .075 .045 .045 .023 .023
46 .085 .085 .046 .046 .026 .026
47 .097 .097 .055 .055 .031 .031
48 .110 .110 .064 .064 .035 .035
49 .124 .124 .076 .076 .040 .040
50 .141 .141 .090 .090 .046 .046
51 .159 .159 .104 .104 .052 .052
52 .180 .180 .120 .120 .062 .062
53 .204 .204 .140 .140 .072 .072
54 .231 .231 .160 .160 .083 .083
55 .261 .261 .185 .185 .097 .097
56 - .002 - .244 .102 .102 .068 .068
57 - .011 - .229 .105 .105 .072 .072
58 - .019 - .215 .118 .118 .076 .076
59 - .027 - .202 .117 .117 .077 .077
60 - .037 - .139 .114 .114 .079 .079
61 - .049 - .178 .099 .099 .068 .068
62 - .059 - .167 .098 .098 .064 .064
63 - .068 - .157 - .060 - .284 .056 .056
64 - .077 - .148 - .069 - .267 .053 .063
65 - .086 - .139 - .079 - .252 .044 .044
66 - .133 - .130 - .150 - .237 - .132 - .225
67 - .177 - .128 - .192 - .233 - .153 - .222
68 - .219 - .127 - .231 - .232 - .172 - .219
69 - .261 - .124 - .260 - .227 - .190 - .216
70 - .301 - .123 - .285 - .223 - .205 - .212
'Assumed postnormal retirement provision:FC = full credit; NC = no credit.Pension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives181
ment provides an addition to otherwise calculated benefits if the individual
postpones retirement until the normal retirement age. The typical early
retirement supplement provides an addition to benefits if retirementoccurs
after the age of early retirement. Retirement supplements, whichare not
available to workers who leave before reaching specifiedages, thus provide
a potentially powerful mechanism for pension bacidoading.
The average accrual rates for percentage of earnings and flat plans with
supplements, with ten-year cliff vesting, and with early and normal
retirement at 55 and 65, respectively, are shown in Table 5 bytype of
supplement. There are just two plans in the category with onlynormal
retirement supplements, but, nonetheless, the effect of the supplements
can be seen in the first column of the table. The accrual rate jumps from
about 8 percent of the wage at age 64 to 60 percent of thewage at age 65.
Thus the supplement generates substantial backloading and providesa
relatively strong incentive to remain with the firm untilage 65, but
thereafter there is a sharp drop in the accrual rate to -18percent.
Accrual rates for plans with early retirement supplementsare shown in
the second column of the table. In thiscase there is a sharp increase in the
average accrual rate from 12 percent of the wage at age 54 to 44 percent at
age 55, with a sharp drop thereafter. Again, the provision increases
bacidoading and provides a substantial incentive to remain with the firm
until the age of early retirement, witha very substantial disincentive to
remaining thereafter. Accrual rates for plans with both types of supple-
ments are shown in the last column of the table. In this case there isa rather
large spike at the age of early retirement, equal to 62percent of the wage in
that year, with a smaller, but still noticeable, spike at about theage of
normal retirement.
Accrual rates for percent of earnings and flat plans with eithertype of
supplement are shown in Table 6 for selected early and normal retirement
ages. The spikes in the accrual rates are highlighted with dashed lines.
Consider, for example, plans with early retirement atage 55. The spike
created by the early retirement supplement is from 0.22 atage 54 to 0.39 at
age 55 for plans with normal retirement at 55, from 0.12 at age 54 to 0.50 at
age 55 for plans with normal retirement at 60, and from 0.11 atage 54 to
0.48 at age 55 for plans with normal retirement at 65. Of the 56 planswith
normal retirement at age 60, the pension accrual rate at thatage is, on
average, equivalent to 100 percent of the wage rate.
Similar discontinuities in the accrual ratiosare evident for plans with
other early and normal retirement ages. For example, of plans withearly
and normal retirement at age 60, the accrual rate at thatage is equivalent to
64 percent of the annual wage for persons aged 60. Thus thesespecial
supplements create very significant one-time additions to pension wealth182Kotlikoff & Wise
TABLE 5
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earningsand Flat
Plans With Ten-Year Cliff Vesting, Early andNormal Retirement at




Normal supplement Early supplement Both supplements
(2 plans) (10 plans) (10 plans)
.065 .111 .035
41 .012 .197 .009
42 .013 .023 .011
43 .015 .026 .013
44 .017 .031 .018
45 .019 .035 .023
46 .022 .040 .030
47 .025 .047 .037
48 .028 .053 .044
49 .032 .060 .052
50 .036 .069 .060
51 .040 .079 .070
52 .045 .094 .081
53 .051 .106 .095
54 .057 .121 .108
55 .065 .442 .621
56 .047 - .0007 - .051
57 .051 - .008 - .049
58 .054 - .014 - .043
59 .058 - .022 - .046
60 .061 - .011 - .051
61 .066 - .049 - .068
62 .070 -.058 -.072
63 .074 - .073 - .080
64 .078 - .022 .009
65 .601 - .031 .008
66 -.181 -.247 -.092
67 -.180 -.213 -.167
68 -.179 -.207 -.164
69 -.179 -.204 -.163
70 -.178 -.201 -.160Pension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives183
TABLE 6
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings and Flat
Plans With Ten-Year Cliff Vesting and Early or Normal Retirement
Supplements, by Early and Normal Retirement agesa
Early ret. 55 55 55 60 60 62
normal ret. 55 60 65 60 65 62
No. of plans 19 56 22 37 2 19
Age
40 .199 .136 .082 .078 .068 .056
41 .039 .024 .015 .014 .012 .010
42 .045 .027 .018 .016 .013 .011
43 .052 .030 .021 .018 .015 .013
44 .059 .034 .025 .020 .017 .151
45 .068 .038 .030 .022 .019 .180
46 .077 .043 .036 .023 .022 .020
47 .088 .049 .041 .027 .025 .023
48 .100 .055 .048 .030 .028 .026
49 .114 .062 .056 .035 .032 .030
50 .129 .070 .064 .039 .036 .035
51 .148 .080 .074 .044 .040 .029
52 .167 .090 .087 .050 .046 .033
53 .191 .103 .099 .057 .053 .039
54 .220 .117 .113 .066 .061 .044
55 .389 .498 .484 .075 .069 .060
56 - .019 .071 .016 .086 .080 .064
57 - .078 .071 .019 .099 .092 .161
58 - .048 .071 - .021 .114 .107 .097
59 - .057 .069 - .026 .132 .123 .110
60 - .067 1.079 - .008 .643 .233 .127
61 -.085-292-.049-.208 .048' .146
62 -.093-.301-.056-.212 .045 .183
63 -.108-.353-.067-.227 .039-078
64 - .079 - .079 - .006 - .102 .072 - .086
65 -.086-.043 .018-.099 .194-.094
66 - .124 - .088-182 - .100 - .048- .169
67 - .141 - .116. - .195 - .088 - .064- .111
68 - .150 - .124 - .191 - .092 - .072- .112
69 - .151 - .132 - .188- .097 - .112 - .113
70 -.151-.141 -.186-.102-.120-.114
There are no plans in the 62-65 or in the 65-65 early-normal retirement groups.184Kotlikoff & Wise
and, therefore, provide very important incentives to remain with the firm
until the age that the special supplement is awarded. The special supple-
ments also further dramatize the wide variation in the incentive effects
implicit in the provisions of private pension plans.
6. PENSION ACCRUAL AND RETIREMENT IN A
LARGE FIRM
This section considers the relationship between pension accrual and
retirement in the Fortune 500 firm whose plan is described in section 3. The
data are the employment and earnings histories between 1969 and 1984 of
all workers employed by the firm in any years between 1980 and 1984.
There are five sex-occupation groups: male and female office workers, male
and female salesworkers, and male managers. The provisions of the firm
pension plan are such that different workers face very different pension
accrual profiles and, thus, pension compensation. As a consequence,
different workers face very different incentives for continued work versus
retirement.
To illustrate these provisions, pension accruals and predicted wages (see
Kotlikoff and Wise (1987)) for managers with different birth and hire years
are shown in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. Thoseborn in 1940 reach age 55
in 1995, and for each of these groups there is a discontinuous increase in
pension wealth in that year. It is $29,639 for those with fifteen years of
service in that year and $82,953 for those with twenty-five years of service.
Comparable jumps occur in 1985 for those born in 1930. Accruals are often
negative for persons over 60. The differences in accruals because of
different amounts of service indicated in the table reflect the fact that the
benefit formula and early retirement reduction factors are service depen-
dent.
Pension accruals provide a large incentive for some groups to stay in the
firm for another year and a strong incentive for others to leave. For
example, staying with the firm in 1985 brings pension accrual of $72,527 for
55-year-old managers with twenty-five years of service (born in 1930 and
hired in 1960), but a loss of $14,936 for 65-year-olds with thirty-five years of
experience (born in 1920 and hired in 1950). Thus there is enormous
variation across older workers in the effective compensation for continued
service. One might expect, therefore, that some groups would be much
more likely than others to retire in a given year.
The pension accrual profiles for other employee groups look very much
like those for male managers. Accrual is minimal during the first years of
service. There is a substantial discontinuous increase in pension wealth atPension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives185
age 55; and accrual typically becomes negative after thirty years of service
sometimes before that. Social Security accrual becomes negative after 65.
The major differences among the groups stem from different age-earnings
profiles. An illustration of the similarity and difference is provided by
comparing Figure 3, which depicts accrual profiles for male managers, with
Figure 7, which depicts profiles for salesmen.
6.1 The Retirement Response to the Pattern of Pension Accrual
Table 9 presents annual departure rates, the proportion of workers who
leave the firm before the end of the year, cross-tabulated by age andyears
of service. Several aspects of the data stand out. There is substantial
turnover in the first nine years of employment, especially during the first
five years. On average, about 15 percent of those employed fiveyears or
less leave in a given year. The table shows rates only for employees 40 and
older. The departure rates are somewhat higher for younger workers, 16or
17 percent for those employed five years or less, and 10 to 12 percent for
those employed 6 to 9 years. There is a sharp decline in departure rates at
ten years of service, when employees are about to become vested in the
pension plan. Before the early retirement age (55), the typical decline is
from 8 or 9 percent to 4 or 5 percent. After 55, when vesting carries with it
eligibility for early retirement, it is much sharper, often from 10 percentor
more to 3 percent or less.
The availability of early retirement benefits at 55 apparently hasa
substantial effect on retirement. Before 55, departure rates are typically
around 2 percent over a broad spectrum of age-service combinations. At 55,
they jump to 10 percent or more. Note that the departure rates stay at that
level until age 60, when there is another jump in the rate of departure. The
jump at 60 corresponds to the age at which pension accrual becomes
negative for many employees.
To understand the potential importance of the early retirement benefits,
suppose that if it were not for this inducement, the departure rates would
remain at 3 percent until age 60, instead of the 10 or 12 percent rates thatare
observed. (Notice that the departure rates for employees aged 55 to 61 who
are in their tenth year of servicenot yet vested and hence not eligible for
early retirement benefitsare also 2 or 3 percent on average.) Departure at
3 percent per year would mean that 14 percent of those employed at 55
would have left before age 60. At a departure rate of 11 percent peryear, 44
percent would leave between 55 and 59. Such a difference, even if only for
a small proportion of all firms, can have a substantial effect on aggregate
labor force participation rates.
The jump in departure rates at 60, especially noticeable for persons with
twenty-five or more years of service, was just mentioned. There is another186Kotlikoff & Wise
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1980 1975 1980 1975 1970 1980
1980 0 0 0 0 508 0
1981 0 0 0 0 380 0
1982 0 0 0 0 770 0
1983 0 0 0 0 582 0
1984 0 1,278 0 2,470 1,494 0
1985 0 251 0 475 767 0
1986 0 663 0 1,335 2,090 0
1987 0 353 0 651 994 0
1988 0 663 0 1,289 1,978 0
1989 1 008 2,15 767 4,037 1,479 2,32322,194
1990 194 38 890 688 1,709 2,676 831
1991 341 69 1,051 1,297 2,174 3,168 1,060
1992 418 84 1,260 1,601 2,675 3,820 609
1993 504 1,01 1,485 2,021 3,202 4,515 -89
1994 606 1,22 1,756 2,603 3,851 5,351 -908
1995 716 1,44 2,04329,63940,727 82,953-2,067
1996 843 1,69 2,555 7,130 9,538 9,898 5,217
1997 987 1,98 2,992 7,349 9,672 11,334 4,579
1998 1,153 2,42 3,499 7,437 9,641 10,665 3,902
1999 1,342 2,96 4,085 7,377 9,426 7,844 3,186
2000 1,558 3,49 3,900 7,140 6,196 8,643 2,423
2001 1,807 4,09 4,481 4,432 2,198-6,178 0
2002 2,093 4,79 5,149 3,750 1,206-7,237 0
2003 2,517 5,58 5,904 2,870 -15-8,380 0
2004 3,037 6,50 6,763 1,791 4,378-9,658 0
2005 2,918 95,43 117,775-2,553-8,981-11,004 0
2006 3,361 11,95 14,674-1,993-4,042-6,843 0
2007 3,872 13,70 16,840-2,784-4,988-7,994 0
2008 4,461 13,02 15,944-3,601-5,955-9,155 0
2009 5 139 9,80 11,879-4,436-6,930-10,299 0
2010 5,910 10,92 13,211-5,265-7,875-11,375 0
2011 6,792-6,58 -8,668 0 0 0 0
2012 7,801-7,78-10,184 0 0 0 0
2013 8,940-9,06-11,809 0 0 0 0
2014 10,223-10,41-13,531 0 0 0 0
2015 168,439-11,84-15,345 0 0 0 0
2016 21,859 - 8,68-12,662 0 0 0 0
2017 25,137-9,99-14,317 0 0 0 0
2018 23,904-11,31-15,995 0 0 0 0
2019 17,968-12,62-17,524 0 0 0 0
2020 19,964-13,84-18,933 0 0 0 0
2021 -12,355 0 0 0 0 0
2022 -14,649 0 0 0 0 0
2023 -17,087 0 0 0 0 0
2024 -19,659 0 0 0 0 0
2025 -22,287 0 0 0 0 0
2026 -21,570 0 0 0 0 0
2027 -24,026 0 0 0 0 0
2028 -26,391 0 0 0 0 0
2029 -28,576 0 0 0 0 0
2030 -30,436 0 0 0 0 0Pension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives187
TABLE 7
1930 1920
1975 1970 1960 1980 1975 1970 1960 1950
0 835 2,686 0 0 1,178 5,146 7,442
0 562 2,059 0 0 -616 -105 -9,132
0 1,413 3,716 0 0 451 2,175 -5,043
0 1,079 2,710 0 0-2,739-2,721 -13,235
2,968 3,053 6,530 0 5,090 658 3,575 -2,995
18,226 26,481 72,527 0-5,357-5,328-8,152-14,936
5,616 8,227 13,781 0 0 8,151 3,728 831
2,593 3,691 4,118 0 0 2,108-4,957-10,017
4,105 5,874 8,553 0 4,176 3,987-1,882 -6,347
3,745 5,342 5,263 0 5,038 2,968-3,049 -7,920
3,280 4,726 5,382 0 4,265 2,109-3,889 -8,984
1,685 2,376 -7,118 0 0 0 0 0
1,389 2,029 -7,356 0 0 0 0 0
683 1,312 -8,127 0 0 0 0 0 -155 419 -8,902 0 0 0 0 0 -1,384-3,515-10,152 0 0 0 0 0
3,628 -939 -5,346 0 0 0 0 0
2,855-1,652 -6,363 0 0 0 0 0
2,041-2,384 -7,386 0 0 0 0 0
1,187-3,129 -8,394 0 0 0 0 0 -1,882-3,874 -9,344 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0188Kotlikoff & Wise
TABLE 8






1980 1975 1980 1975 1970 1980
1980 20,405 24,053 33,021 27,894 34,020 40,712 31,825
1981 22,852 26,082 34,967 29,403 35,354 41,85332,739
1982 25,312 28,057 36,807 30,819 36,586 42,898 33,548
1983 27,757 29,965 38,542 32,141 37,720 43,858 34,256
1984 30,615 32,271 40,774 33,869 39,342 45,410 35,390
1985 33,479 34,543 42,948 35,535 40,904 46,913 36,447
1986 36,331 36,774 45,069 37,140 42,409 48,374 37,427
1987 39,155 38,960 47,139 38,685 43,859 49,794 38,331
1988 41,933 41,092 49,158 40,163 45,250 51,168 39,152
1989 44,653 43,166 51,12841,572 46,580 52,493 39,886
1990 47,309 45,183 53,05642,913 47,850 53,766 40,530
1991 49,904 47,147 54,951 44,187 49,059 54,987 41,083
1992 52,429 49,052 56,809 45,387 50,198 56,140 41,533
1993 54,889 50,900 58,636 46,509 51,262 57,216 41,873
1994 57,292 52,698 60,438 47,553 52,247 58,206 42,099
1995 59,645 54,444 62,216 48,514 53,142 59,093 42,200
1996 61,954 56,140 63,969 49,382 53,935 59,860 42,166
1997 64,230 57,786 65,695 50,151 54,615 60,487 41,988
1998 66,481 59,380 67,389 50,812 55,166 60,954 41,656
1999 68,717 60,920 69,047 51,353 55,573 61,236 41,161
2000 70,946 62,398 70,655 51,760 55,816 61,307 40,493
2001 73,178 63,814 72,206 52,023 55,879 61,148 0
2002 75,415 65,151 73,676 52,123 55,739 60,728 0
2003 77,667 66,402 75,052 52,047 55,381 60,028 0
2004 79,931 67,550 76,307 51,779 54,783 59,027 0
2005 82,213 68,581 77,417 51,305 53,931 57,709 0
2006 84,502 69,471 78,349 50,609 52,810 56,063 0
2007 86,796 70,199 79,069 49,678 51,410 54,084 0
2008 89,081 70,739 79,543 48,503 49,727 51,778 0
2009 91,347 71,067 79,735 47,081 47,764 49,160 0
2010 93,567 71,151 79,604 45,408 45,526 46,251 0
2011 95,721 70,965 79,114 0 0 0 0
2012 97,774 70,478 78,230 0 0 0 0
2013 99,694 69,665 76,922 0 0 0 0
2014 101,438 68,503 75,168 0 0 0 0
2015 102,959 66,974 72,952 0 0 0 0
2016 104,202 65,062 70,267 0 0 0 0
2017 105,115 62,766 67,124 0 0 0 0
2018 105,638 60,090 63,546 0 0 0 0
2019 105,712 57,051 59,572 0 0 0 0
2020 105,277 53,675 55,254 0 0 0 0
2021 104,279 0 0 0 0 0 0
2022 102,671 0 0 0 0 0 0
2023 100,415 0 0 0 0 0 0
2024 97,484 0 0 0 0 0 0
2025 93,875 0 0 0 0 0 0
2026 89,598 0 0 0 0 0 0
2027 84,690 0 0 0 0 0 0
2028 79,209 0 0 0 0 0 0
2029 73,239 0 0 0 0 0 0
2030 66,886 0 0 0 0 0 0Pension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives189
TABLE 8
1930 1920
1975 1970 1960 1980 1975 1970 1960 1950
34,945 38,666 48,446 35,723 35,788 36,519 40,186 47,598
35,666 39,226 48,813 36,006 35,902 36,470 39,794 46,774
36,289 39,693 49,098 36,188 35,919 36,323 39,280 45,765
36,819 40,074 49,300 36,276 35,845 36,080 38,642 44,568
37,818 40,977 50,156 36,819 36,215 36,277 38,446 43,828
38,741 41,803 50,919 37,271 36,488 36,362 38,092 42,847
39,588 42,551 51,579 37,632 36,660 36,333 37,574 41,624
40,358 43,216 52,122 37,900 36,728 36,181 36,885 40,157
41,042 43,785 52,524 38,066 36,679 35,895 36,014 38,445
41,633 44,249 52,765 38,124 36,507 35,467 34,956 36,499
42,127 44,599 52,826 38,067 36,205 34,891 33,713 34,339
42,517 44,827 52,690 0 0 0 0 0
42,790 44,914 52,329 0 0 0 0 0
42,935 44,847 51,724 0 0 0 0 0
42,946 44,616 50,861 0 0 0 0 0
42,809 44,207 49,725 0 0 0 0 0
42,513 43,607 48,307 0 0 0 0 0
42,048 42,805 46,602 0 0 0 0 0
41,403 41,794 44,615 0 0 0 0 0
40,570 40,568 42,359 0 0 0 0 0
39,542 39,125 39,852 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0'0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0














FIGURE 7. Pension wealth accrual, SS accrual and wage earnings for
salesmen born in 1960 and hired in 1980, in real 1985 dollars.
sharp increase in departure rates at 62 when Social Security benefits are
first available. The increase at 62 is also noticeable for employees with less
than ten years of service and not yet vested in the firm's pension plan. They
can take Social Security benefits, of course.
Finally, there is a very sharp increase in the departure rate at age 65. For
many workers the total reward for working after age 65 isclose to zero, due
to negative pension and Social Security accruals. It is important tokeep in
mind that the large departure rates before 65 mean that most employees
have left well before that age. Thus high annual departure rates at 65
indicate only that a large proportion of the few that continue working until
65 retire then. This point is highlighted in Table 10, which presents the
cumulative fraction remaining with the firm from age 50 to each specified
age.
Note first that departure rates of employees who have been in the firm
for only eight to ten years and are not yet vested are very low at every age,
as emphasized above. And again, the increase inthe departure rates at 55,
60, 62, and 65 stands out. Based on the 1981 and 1983 departure rates, only
48 percent of those employed at 50 would still be employed at 60, and then
17 percent of these would leave. Only 10 percent would remain until age 65
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TABLE 9
Departure Rates, by Age and Years of Service, of All Employee Groups
(percent)
Years of service
Age 56-91011-1516-20 21-23 24252627282930 31+
401585 7 4 3 0
411495 7 5 5 35
4214108 8 4 2 2200 4315 76 5 44 432000 4413 85 7 3 23111000 4511 75 6 64 3142350 .5 4612 9 3 5 34 4105220 0 4714 8 8 5 4 33444042 0 4812 75 6 4 42512423 2 4914 9 4 7 4 35111120 0 5014 84 6 4 33221132 3 5114 93 5 3 35234222 5 5211 75 6 4 42424136 6 5312 74 7 4 33332333 3 5411 74 6 4 24223101 3
55 954 11 9 11131013111279 9
5611 66 12 11 12 78111112161412
571210 1 11 8 91089931411 11
5813102 8 8 12131113159101312
59 710217 8 11171413149101215
60 9 93 15 12 191617 201620151926
61 9 72 16 17 151912 251623212430
621115 727 34 373433 38404234 3041
631418433 35 374335 43416233 4740
64 58 336 33 34 1832 2627 42534134
6512354557 52 544455 57 7050546959
66261725 16 16 43501620253833924
6713281832 17 29 0142101333 5021
68135050 15 25 11 05002900012
The data also show the effect of a special early retirement incentive that
was in effect in 1982 only. The incentive program provided a bonus to
employees who were eligible for early retirement in 1982; that is, those who
were vested and were 55 years old or older. The bonus was equivalent to
three months salary for 55-year-old employees and increased to twelve192Kotlikoff & Wise
TABLE 10
Cumulative and Yearly Departure Rates by Calendar Year, Years of
Services, and Age
Cumulative Fraction
yDRa YDR Staying in Firm
(8-10 y0Sb) (11 + YOS) (11+ YOS)
Age 1980 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983
50 7 97 97 97
51 9 3 94 94 94
52 3 5 5 89 89 89
53 0 4 4 85 86 86
54 4 3 4 2 83 83 84
55 5 11 12 10 74 73 75
56 4 12 14 10 66 63 68
57 2 9 12 11 60 56 61
58 5 10 14 12 54 48 54
59 2 11 20 10 48 38 48
60 4 17 29 17 40 27 40
61 0 17 32 18 33 18 33
62 8 36 48 31 21 10 23
63 14 37 54 37 13 5 14
64 29 49 26 10 2 11
YDR = yearly departure rates.
bYOS = years of service.
months salary for 60-year-olds. At age 65, the bonus was twelve months
salary for employees with twenty or fewer years of service and declined to
six months salary for those with thirty to thirty-nine years ofservice.
It is clear that the effect of the incentive was large. The departure rates for
1981 and for 1983 are virtually identical. But the rates were muchhigher in
1982. For example, the departure rate for 60-year-olds was 17 percent in
1981 and in 1983, but 32 percent in 1982. For those aged 63, the departure
rate was 37 percent in 1981 and in 1983, but 54 percent in 1982.Of those
employed at age 50, 40 percent would stifi have been employed after age 60
based on the 1981 and 1983 departure rates. Only 27 percent would remain
after age 60 based on the 1982 rates.
A great deal of effort has been devoted to estimating the effect of Social
Security provisions on labor force participation. In particular, Hausman
and Wise (1985), Burtless (1986), and Boskin and Hurd (1984) have
65 58 45 5 1 6
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attempted to estimate the effecton labor force participation of the increases
in Social Security benefits during the early 1970s.It would appear from the
results here that the effects of these across-the-boardincreases in Social
Security benefits are likely to be small relativeto the effects of the private
pension provisions. For example, itseems clear that shifting the age of early
retirement in the firm plan from 55 to 60 wouldhave a very dramatic effect
on departure rates. Leaving the early retirementage at 55, but eliminating
negative pension and Social Security accruals, thereafter,would apparently
also have a substantial effecton retirement rates.
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Most defined benefit plansare strongly backloaded, notwithstanding
ERISA legislation aimed at limiting it. Fora sizable fraction of defined
benefit plans, the special shape of pensionaccrual profiles produced
significant incentives to remain with one'scurrent employer before early
retirement. After the age of normal retirement, andoften after early
retirement, pension accrual profiles typically providesubstantial incentives
to leave employment. They impose a large implicittax on employment.
These retirement incentivesappear large when compared, for example,
with the retirement incentives arising under SocialSecurity. Hence, the
structure of private pensions may be contributing substantiallyto the very
high rates of early retirement currently observedin the United States.
Under the contract view of labor markets,pension accrual profiles might
be thought of as carrot-stick incentivesto continue working diligently to
some age and to retire at a subsequent age. Thispresumes that pension
accrual profiles are well understood by both employersand workers. In our
view this is unlikely. The great complexity ofpension provisions makes it
quite difficult for either employersor workers, in the absence of assistance
from actuaries, to calculate correctly their accruedpension benefits. A few
firms, including the large Firm examined here,provide accrual information
annually to their workers, but most, apparently, donot. It also appears that
many firms with access to actuaries do not have their actuaries calculate
worker-specific accrual.
It is important to understand the effects ofpension plan provisions on
the labor force participation of older workers. But thecontract view of the
labor market also makes it clear that evaluation ofpension accrual is best
considered in conjunction withage-wage compensation profiles. If, for
example, legislation were to prevent the reductionin the compensation of
older workers through pension plan provisions,such reduction might be
sought through reduction of wage and salaryearnings, to conform to
age-productivity profiles. In this case, what constitutesage discrimination194Kotlikoff & Wise
and the potential effects of age discriminationlegislation must also be
considered. A partial view of the whole may yield decisionswith unfore-
seen and unintended consequences.Pension plan provisions may provide
a graceful way ofmaking adjustments in a firm's labor force, and, in
particular, of releasing older workers from the laborforce. On the other
hand, the decision to continue work at older ages is not, now, aneutral
one. In the words of tax analysts,the playing field is far from flat. Should
individual preferences for work versus retirement beconstrained by the
implicit wage-tax structure of pension plans?
The backloading of pension accrual in the presence oflimited worker and
employer understanding of such backloading raises a varietyof important
questions. Do workers over- or undervalue theiraccrued vested pension
benefits? Do workers over- or undersave because theyunder- or overvalue
their pensions? Are workers who leave highlybackloaded firms prior to the
age of early retirement, at which ageaccrual is often very substantial, aware
of the often substantial pension costs of their actions? Isaccrual backload-
ing raising the economic costs of early disability,because workers who
become disabled prior to the age of early retirement receiveless generous
pensions than those who remain through earlyretirement? Should em-
ployers be required to provide workers with annual statementsdetailing
accrued vested benefits as well as the time path of futureprojected pension
accrual? These and related questions may need to beasked by employers,
workers, and the United States Congress.
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